This conference related mediation and negotiation theory to identity disputes in order to improve conflict resolution in global and regional contexts. The emphasis was on comparative case study of different violent conflict situations throughout the world in which group identity was a key motivating factor. This is an increasingly prevalent and troubling form of political conflict, as seen in areas ranging from Bosnia to South Africa. Each presentation focused on the characteristics of the conflict, specifics of the conflict environment and process, and the success or failure of resolution attempts. The conference concluded with a discussion of the general trends of peacemaking intervention (mediation, conciliation, facilitated negotiation) and can stimulate througout a journal publication further research, theoretical development, and policy reform.
 

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 The conference began with a keynote overview by Dr. Jay Rothman, of Antioch College, on the implication for theory and policy of identity conflict as a form of intractable dispute. Dr. Rothman raised questions regarding the ARIA process which included the following specifics: antagonism in mutual discussions; to what extent were parties able to become reflexive; how do they parties focus on mutual underlying needs and values if and when parties invent new remedies or solutions; and finally what are the dominating aspects for follow up actions and plans. Dr. Rothman stressed the importance of pre-negotiation processes in improving conflict negotiation outcomes.

 Both, Dr. Rothman, and Wayne State University international law specialist Dr. Brad Roth, served as respondents to individual case study presentations. Each presentation considered the following criteria:

Throughout the discussions participants considered forms of mediation, negotiation, and conciliation led to specific results.

The series of identity dispute mediation/conciliation cases which were reviewed during the day:
List of Speaker:
1. Northern Ireland - Dr. Sean Byrne, Nova Southeastern University
3. South Africa - Davin Bremner, George Mason University
4. Bosnia - Dr. Robin Remington, University of Missouri-Columbia
5. Former Soviet Republics and Russia - Dr. Jeff Chinn, University Missouri- Columbia
6. Cyprus - Dr. Ronald Fisher, University of Saskatchewan
7. Indroduction - Dr. Jay Rothman,  Antioch College
8. Respondent - Dr. Brad Roth,  Wayne State University
9. Summary - Dr. Frederic S. Pearson,  Wayne State University
 

Jay Rothman Summary
In order to understand conflict resolution, we first have to understand the purpose of conflict. Jay Rothman argues that conflict is an expression of the vernacular. It helps us to articulate what we care most deeply about and why. As a result, conflict resolution should promote the purposes of conflict. Rothman discussed the three frames of conflict identification: the resource frame, the interest frame, and the identity frame. The resource frame views conflict in terms of the what the participants want out of the conflict, for example, many conflicts are over territory. The conflict management process for this frame is negotiation. Conflict resolution, however, says we can go beneath the resource frame to identify the underlying needs of the participants in conflict. This is the interest frame. The conflict management method for interest framing is problem solving.
The third frame identified by Rothman involves setting a new frame next to resources and beginning from there. The identity frame seeks to understand what the conflict is for, what it serves. The purpose of this frame, according to Rothman, is to establish engagement. Rothman has identified a framework to help with the conflict resolution process involved with the identity frame. This ARIA framework involves initial antagonism, moving toward resonance, then invention, and finally action. Through this conflict management process participants are able to reframe the conflict around who they are and why the conflict matters so much to them.

Discussion of Rothman by Brad Roth
Roth, a lawyer and political scientist, comes to the discussion from a position where mediated solutions to problems are not always discussed as a solution. As a result, he found RothmanÕs work to be a valuable contribution to international law. On the other hand, Roth would like to see the concept of ideology explored and included in the Rothman model. Roth argues that ideology is often the way people frame conflict; this creates certain problems which are not addressed by Rothman. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is viewed differently whether one is an Israeli hard-liner versus an Israeli who is not a hard-liner. The ideology of a participant in a conflict may or may not directly conflict with the other side, or parties on the same side.

Sean Byrne Summary: Northern Ireland
Sean Byrne discussed the Northern Ireland with a concentration on the coercive consociational model of conflict resolution. This is a power sharing approach to ethnic conflict where in the establishment of joint government structures, with representation for each party to the conflict, is involved. Part of the problem with this approach is its concentration on elite level politics; it does not include grassroots organizations. When a portion of the stakeholders are excluded, as is happening in Ireland, conflict resolution is ineffectual. There are three recent critical periods in the Northern Ireland conflict. The first involves British policy from 1972 to 1974. During this phase, resolution was attempted through one-party majoritarian rule. There was a strong fear of a unified Ireland. As a result, the Republic of Ireland was excluded from the resolution process initiated by Britain.
The second period discussed by Byrne starts in 1985 when the Irish government is finally recognized as a partner in resolution attempts. This begins a departure in Anglo-Irish relations. On the other hand, this also created fear in the minds of the Unionists. They felt betrayed by Britain.
This fear is expanded in the final period from 1993 to present. During this time, both the British and the Irish governments have been working together towards a coercive consociational government. Byrne argues that a different approach is needed, de-emphasizing the elite Òtop-downÓ perspective. All parties need to be involved, particularly those involved in grassroots organization. This is where the most suffering has occurred, and therefore, where the healing and the buy-in to peace agreements needs to begin.

Ronald Fisher Summary: Cyprus
Ronald Fisher began his discussion of the conflict in Cyprus with a brief history of the small island. Cyprus is a country easily invaded. Its history includes 300 years as a part of the Ottoman Empire, as well as 100 years of British rule. More recently, the conflict within Cyprus can be viewed as a product of World War II and the sweeping concept of self-determination. The Greek Cypriots looked for union with Greece. The external players in the Cyprus conflict have included Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the United States. There is a Òdouble minorityÓ problem influencing the conflict. The Turkish Cypriots are, within the island, a minority to the Greek Cypriot majority. However, with the inclusion of Turkey as a player in the area, the Greek Cypriots become a minority.
In 1960, a consociational power sharing arrangement was created providing Cyprus with independence. The Greek Cypriots believed that more power was shifted to the Turkish Cypriots than necessary given their status as a minority. Intercommunal violence of 1963 was then followed by a provisional Cyprus government in 1967. The situation changed dramatically in July of 1974 when a military coup in Athens placed a military junta in power. As a result, civil war began. This prompted intervention by Turkey. Turkish Cypriots moved into enclaves for protection. This has created two entirely separate militarized communities with a UN buffer.
Fisher provided a discussion of conflict resolution attempts in Cyprus. In addition to the official channels of resolution, many unofficial measures have been utilized throughout the conflict. In October of 1966, John Burton organized a workshop in London which brought members of the conflict together. The success of the workshop was an agreement to move back to negotiations. A similar attempt was made shortly after by the Center for Mediation Studies in Rome, only to be thwarted by the coup of 1974. Informal mediation attempts did not occur for several years following the coup. Cypriots had grown leery of outside intervention. The situation did change later, however. Herb Kelman, and his group from Harvard, provided interactive problem solving workshops. This conflict resolution attempt was followed by Leonard Doob in 1985. DoobÕs resolution techniques were beginning to find success when they were terminated by the Turkish Cypriot community.
In June of 1991, Fisher began a series of workshops assisted by the Canadian Institute involving Canadian and American Cypriots who were involved in the conflict. At this point, the Institute was eliminated by the conservative Canadian government. Fisher was able to find another funding source, however. As a result, he has identified one of the key issues which must be dealt with in the Cypriot conflict. Resolution attempts, according to Fisher, must begin to get rid of the image problem between the two communities. It is important to understand in this conflict, as well as in others, the role of institutions in maintaining the conflict. Textbooks and teachers educate children about the conflict and their enemies in such a way as to perpetuate the suspicion and hostility. According to Fisher, this must be understood if conflict resolution attempts are ever going to be successful. As a result, unofficial resolution attempts need to be integrated into larger educational attempts.

Robin Remington Summary: Bosnia
The former Yugoslavia is an area of competing cultures and political identities. Historically, there have been many intermarriages and a feeling that despite these cultures and identities, the people of Yugoslavia could live peacefully. The collapse of Communism changed this feeling. According to Dr. Remington, the Cold War ideology still needs an enemy.
One of the initial problems following the collapse of the Soviet Union in dealing with Bosnia has been the Òlinguistic underminingÓ by power players, including the United States. By referring to Bosnians only in terms of ÒBosnian Muslims,Ó others within Bosnia were led to strengthen their identification with their surrounding Òhomeland.Ó Remington argues that the international community has viewed itself as a fireman trying to stop the fires of nationalism, but she sees their role as more of a pyromaniac, despite their good intentions.
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has also been exposed to the coercive consociational model discussed previously by Byrne and Fisher. Remington argues that it is important to understand that resolution attempts will not get very far if one only tries to resolve the issue among elites. One has to involve all of the stakeholders, and this is a very important point within this conflict. The neglect of specific members of the conflict has created massive problems.
Remington also discussed the ways in which the Rothman framework could be applied to the situation in the Balkans. Remington again stresses that the situation will not improve through elite coercive consociationalism. Other things have to happen prior to dealing with the elites. This is where Remington adds her theory to the mix. One has to begin by building credibility at levels where people can actually do something about it. There is a project at the University of Missouri where indigenous Bosnians have come to learn to work with children and childrenÕs trauma. Essentially this project trains the trainers. It is in this area where Remington believes RothmanÕs model is useful.
In reality, within Bosnia, there is a large group of young people and others who want to move on from the conflict. For example, there has been a consistent underutilization of womenÕs groups in resolution attempts. Many of these groups have been communicating across lines throughout the conflict. Remington argues there will be no peace in Bosnia unless it comes from below and these groups must be involved.
Remington concludes by arguing that peace in the Balkans depends on approaching peace as more than the absence of war.

Louis Kriesberg Summary: Israelis-Palestinians
Louis Kriesberg began his discussion with a theoretical approach to understanding how conflict arises. There are four conditions which he views as necessary. First, conflict arises when there is a sense of collective identity. Secondly, there must be a grievance on the part of that collective. Thirdly, there must be a belief that another group is the source of the grievance. Finally, a conflict will arise when the collective believes they can do something to change or relieve their grievance.
Kriesberg discussed some interesting characteristics which apply to all conflicts, including the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Conflicts are never static and there are many different conflicts within the realm of one. Any conflict is interlinked with others. Despite the seeming intractability of some of the conflicts presented at this conference, they are not inherently destructive or intractable. These conflicts have been transformed to fit that description.
The importance of Òquasi-mediatorsÓ is often underestimated, according to Kriesberg. Sometimes they are able to do something that mediators cannot do. They can become more directly involved on one side or the other, and can often communicate more freely between sides.
Kriesberg compared and contrasted different kinds of mediation. On one side of the spectrum you have big power mediation, and on the other, you have the conflict resolution/facilitator model. Big power mediation can be powerful, but it may not always be effective. In the case of the conflict at hand, it has failed. However, it has set up a situation where something else could be successful, such as the lower key Oslo Agreement of 1993.
The conflict resolution/facilitator method of mediation also can be important and useful. Through facilitation members of the conflict learn how to communicate with each other, so that when the window of opportunity arises, progress can be made. Conflict resolution techniques provide the experience of interaction.
The Oslo agreement of 1993 can be viewed as a mediation type somewhere between the two extremes presented above. It was an agreement reached in secrecy. In fact, the United States remained completely unaware of the process until it had produced results. Immediately it was denounced as a sellout. One has to ask the question: What did Arafat get? He achieved identification as the PLO head and some small concessions, but the Palestinians had expected more. The Jewish community was not happy with the agreement either. Terrorism increased on both sides. Hamas was not involved in the peace process. This raises some interesting questions. Do you have all parties represented? If you do, you may not reach an agreement; however, if you do not, you may not achieve implementation.
Kriesberg identifies one of the problems with the Oslo agreement of 1993 as its lack of grassroots involvement, which is primarily due to the secrecy. According to Kriesberg, as with the prior presenters, you have to move towards resolution on all levels.

Jeff Chinn Summary: Moldova
The conflict in Moldova is an example of outside parties trying to impose a settlement. The country was a Soviet Republic. When the Soviet Union disintegrated there was an agreement that borders were not going to change. Russia, as well as the outside communities, were unwilling to think about border revisions. This exacerbated problems within Moldova.
Although there are five Moldovan regions experiencing difficulties, Chinn concentrated his talk on the Trans-Dniestrian Region. Here, as a result, of Soviet military occupation, approximately 60% of the population speaks Russian, compared with the rest of Moldova, which speaks primarily Romanian. Due to the connection to the Soviet military, Trans-Dniestra holds a lot of arms. Chinn sees the conflict in Moldova as an interactive process. As the nation tries to serve its own members, it makes others define who they are in relation, thus, provoking the reactivity of the minority.
During the late 1980s, there was a mobilization of different territories within the Soviet Union. The original mobilization within Moldova was towards unification with Romania. This frightened the Russian-speaking element within the country. As a result, Trans-Dniestria and Gagauz declared independence from Moldova. There was a short war in 1992 where Russia supported Trans-Dniestria. Since then there has been de facto independence. The world community has not recognized this independence, but for all practical purposes, Trans-Dniestria is functioning as an independent state.
There are consistent efforts to bring back Moldova. The role of the OSCE has been to try and negotiate some sort of agreement which would accomplish this goal. In 1993, a member of the OSCE drafted a settlement without the inclusion of local people involved in the conflict. Chinn describes the settlement as an imposition of the OSCE. The agreement provided for Òspecial statusÓ for Trans-Dniestria. Since this draft, there have been monthly meetings with representatives from Moldova and Trans-Dniestria attempting to iron out the details of a unified Moldova, with little success. Chinn argues that this may be due to the process starting from faulty assumptions. Must borders be immutable? Yet the concession of changing a border opens a whole can of worms for a lot of other republics of the former Soviet Union.

Davin Bremner Summary: South Africa
Davin Bremner discussed his involvement in the peace process in two towns in South Africa: Thokoza and Meadowlands. Each area involves the same war between the African National Congress and the Inkata Freedom Party. The conflicts within these locales have their roots in the Apartheid regime, with attempts to create a context of black-on-black violence in order to maintain white rule, a tactic also known as Òdivide and rule.Ó The two towns represent two different approaches to resolution, despite the conflict being the same. Bremner identifies the first attempt as a failure, and the second as a success. He also identifies this conflict as a community conflict rather than an ethnic conflict.
The Thokoza resolution attempt used the labor negotiation model, where you have four persons from each side sitting across from each other. Bremner and other members of the locally-based resolution center referred to each group as though they were divided. They viewed the two sides as enemies, and as a result, they acted as such. The result was violence.
The same locally-based mediation center attempted resolution in the Meadowlands. Here they were forced to take a different approach. Due to the violence in Thokoza, people in the Meadowlands did not welcome conflict resolution. The mediators were able to bring members of the community together, however, so long as they did not talk about the current violence. They facilitated discussions within this group involving the community history. What developed was analytical problem solving. Through this process, the mediators were able to establish trust among all involved. As the fighting within the community escalated, therefore, the members of the community began to turn to the conflict resolution center for mediation. The group created a joint monitoring structure which ran daily and lasted more than two years. A cease-fire was never signed; life just normalized.
The process involved in Meadowlands put community identity first, which created a non-threatening environment for all involved. The resolution process in Thokoza, on the other hand, focused on the violence, and was therefore, unsuccessful.

Conclusions and Themes by Frederic Pearson
The conference highlighted the need to involve grassroots negotiation processes in devising structures to handle long-standing ethnic disputes. Even enlightened democratic consociational approaches, as practiced over time, for example, in Belgium and the Netherlands, are subject to failure if they diverge greatly from what is happening Òin the streets.Ó (Lebanon was a classic failure in this regard.) At the same time, specific forms of negotiation may be called for in specific circumstances, as seen in the contrasting South African experiences. Innovation may be necessary, such as adjustment of agendas to exclude certain topics. Indeed, the Òtruth and reconciliationÓ process itself is a unique intervention and model which bears close evaluation and replication. The introduction and conclusion sections will lay out the circumstances under which various negotiation and pre-negotiation approaches seem feasible and best suited.

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